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The 2005 NPT Review Conférence and Nuclear Disarmament
Mitsuru KUROSAWA*
  The 2005 Review Conférence of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifération of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) was held for four weeks from May 2 to 27 at the headquarters of
the United Nations in New York. Although it was expected that states parties 
would deeply discuss every issue on nuclear non-prolifération and nuclear 
disarmament, review the operation of the treaty and recommend measures to be 
taken in the coming Pive years, the conférence spent more than half of the time on 
the resolution of a procedural matter, and the three Main Committees could not 
agree on final consensus papers. As a result, the conférence failed to adopt a final 
consensus document on substantive matters. 
  The conférence is, in general, assessed as a failure. The failure will weaken the 
international nuclear non-prolifération regime and have a negative influence on 
peace and security in the international community as a whole. 
  This paper will examine the issue of nuclear disarmament in particular. What 
kinds of discussions were conducted at the review conférence? What kinds of 
confrontations appeared at the conférence? What kinds of implications do the 
discussions have for the future progress of nuclear disarmament? 
  First, I will analyze the international security environment since 2000, focusing 
on the characteristics of the security environment in the context of nuclear non-
prolifération and disarmament, and the development of arguments at preparatory 
committees. Second, I will follow the process of the conférence both on procedural 
matters and substantive matters. Third, as the central focal point of the paper, I will 
examine the discussions on nuclear disarmament at the conférence by considering 
the process of discussion and the points of confrontation on each of the main 
nuclear disarmament issues. Finally, I will assess the conférence as a whole and 
ponder next steps.
* Mitsuru Kurosawa is a Professor of International Law and International Relations at the Osaka 
   School of International Public Policy and Graduate School of Law, Osaka University, Japan.
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Situations before the Conférence
Security Environment since 2000
  The 2000 NPT Review Conférence was the most successful NPT Review 
Conférence as ail three main committees reached an agreement and the states 
parties adopted a final document with consensus. In particular, they agreed on 13 
concrete steps for nuclear disarmament including an unequivocal undertaking to 
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. The outcome of the 
conférence was very useful for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-
prolifération regime.1J
  The change in international security circumstances five years after the 2000 
conférence has been considerable, and the 2005 conférence was held under 
completely différent international circumstances than previous conférences. There 
are many aspects of change, but the following two are the most important and 
significant. 
  The first is the emergence of "the second generation of nuclear prolifération" 
that was not anticipated when the treaty was negotiated and concluded. States 
parties such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea were in non-compliance or 
violation of the obligations under the treaty, while they were parties to the NPT. 
North Korea made a statement to withdraw from the treaty in January 2003, and 
declared its possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005. Libya agreed te, 
abandon its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs after 
negotiations with the United Kingdom and the United States in December 2003. 
The war in Iraq, led by the U.S. and the U.K. in April 2003 destroyed the regime of 
Saddam Hussein, but later it was announced by the U.S. that no weapons of mass 
destruction existed in the country. 
  Suspicion of Iran's nuclear program started in October 2003, when an 18 year 
long clandestine uranium enrichment program was revealed. While Iran insists that 
ail it desires is the peaceful use of nuclear energy, recognized under the NPT, the 
U.S. and others suspect that it is developing a program for making nuclear weapons 
and has demanded that Iran stop its program. This point was one of the sharpest 
confrontations at the 2005 review conférence. In addition te, these so-called rogue
1) On the analysis of the 2000 NPT review conférence, see, Mitsuru Kurosawa, "The 2000 NPT 
   Review Conférence and Nuclear Disarmament," Osaka University Law Review, No.48, February 
   2001, pp.1-38.
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states, non-state actors such as terrorists are a new threat to the international 
community. 
  The second is a radical change of U.S. policy in general and nuclear policy in 
particular with the transition from the Clinton administration to the Bush 
administration. The changes from multilateralism to unilateralism in the 
international community, and from a supporter to a neglecter of international norms 
and institutions are based on the philosophical backbone of the Bush 
administration. It is an attempt to keep the sphere of discretionary power as wide as 
possible. 
  This tendency has been strengthened and widened by the terrorist attacks on the 
U.S. on September 11, 2001. The U.S. strongly opposed to the CTBT that would 
prevent he development of new types of nuclear weapons, and declared the U.S. 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty which would prevent he U.S. deployment of 
missile defense systems. In addition, the U.S. submitted The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America in September 2002, and National Strategy 
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2002. They permit the use 
of force that would transcend the right of self-defense as traditionally understood.
Arguments at Preparatory Committees
  The first session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 review conférence 
started in 2002. The U.S. stressed the importance of non-prolifération aspects and 
in particular argued that the issue of non-compliance was the most urgent and we 
should concentrate our efforts on non-compliance. On the other hand, non-nuclear-
weapon states, and mainly non-aligned states (NAM), emphasized the Jack of 
progress in nuclear disarmament, and argued that we should discuss the 
implementation of the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon 
states. 
  In 2002 and 2003, the U.S. stated that it would not support and implement all 13 
steps agreed to in 2000, because it was opposed strongly to the CTBT and withdrew 
from the ABM Treaty, but it unambiguously supported Article VI and the goal of 
nuclear disarmament.2) However, at the third session of the preparatory committee 
in 2004, the U.S. stated: "The U.S. remains strongly committed to its Article VI
2) On the arguments at the 1" and 2"d sessions of the preparatory committee, sec Mitsuru Kurosawa, 
   "Nuclear Non -Prolifération Regime and Nuclear Disarmament: Implementation of the 2000 Final 
   Document," Osaka University Laxm Review, No.51, February 2004, pp. 1-19.
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obligations, and President Bush has made major contributions to the goals of 
Article VI. We can not divert our attention from the violations we face by focusing 
on Article VI issues that do not exist." 3) The U.S. treats the agreements of the 
previous review conférences - decisions and a resolution adopted without votes as 
the package with the decision on an indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995 and 
the final document adopted by consensus in 2000 as not effective anymore, 
because the international security environnent has radically changed. 
  At the 1st and 2nd sessions, the chairman's fact summary which summarizes the 
content of the discussion was formally adopted and incorporated into the report of 
the session. However, at the 3rd session, a chairman's fact summary was not 
adopted as a formal document of the session, because of the strong opposition by 
the U.S. More importantly, the final and 3rd session failed to agree on its 
provisional agenda, subsidiary bodies, and background ocumentations, because the 
states parties could not agree how to deal with the agreements at previous review 
conférences. They only agreed on its date and venue, rules of procedure, president 
and other officiais, secretary general, and financing.4) 
  In the case of the 2000 review conférence, a consensus was not reached on 
subsidiary bodies at the preparatory committee, but they agreed on its provisional 
agenda. In addition, on the establishment of subsidiary bodies, consultation led to 
agreement just before the conférence, and on the first day of the conférence they 
were established. 
  Before the 2005 conférence started on May 2, extensive consultation was held, 
but consensus on the provisional agenda could not be established.
Proceedings of the Conférence
Characteristics of the Arguments at the Conférence
  At the conférence, substantive discussion is held at three Main Committees. 
The Main Committee I deals with nuclear disarmament, the Main Committee II 
deals with non-prolifération and safeguards and the Main Committee III deals with
3) Statement by US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R. 
   Bolton to the 3rd session of preparatory committee for the 2005 review conférence of the NPT, 
   "The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance," New York, April 27, 2004. 
4) On the 2004 preparatory committee, see, John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, "Fiddling While 
   Rome Burns? The 2004 NPT PrepCom," The Nonprolifèration Reniew, Vol.11, No.2, Summer 
   2004,pp.116-141.
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peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Only if all three main committees ucceed in 
adopting a consensus document, will a final document for the conférence as a 
whole be adopted at the plenary meeting. 
  At the previous review conférences, discussion on nuclear disarmament has 
been so hot and confrontational that the elaboration of a consensus document in the 
Main Committee I has been very difficult. In contrast, in the Main Committees II
and III, it has been rather easy to achieve consensus documents. For example, at 
the 1990 and 1995 Review Conférences, the Main Committees II and III agreed on 
consensus documents, but the Main Committee I did not. At times it has been 
suggested that as so many confrontational issues are included in the Main 
Committee I, some of them should be transferred to the Main Committee II or III. 
  This traditional characteristic hanged considerably at the 2005 Review 
Conférence, because many new and confrontational issues have emerged in the 
fields of non-prolifération and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a result, each of 
the three main committees had to deal with and try to resolve new issues. This was 
the most eminent characteristic of the conférence in 2005. 
  The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan states that "nuclear 
threats remain. Indeed, in the Pive years since you last met, the world has 
reawakened to nuclear dangers, both new and old. And we all bear a heavy 
responsibility to build an efficient, effective, and equitable system that reduces 
nuclear threats, I challenge you to accept that disarmament, non-prolifération and 
the right to peaceful uses are all vital," and recommends action on the following 
issues:51 
  1) You must strengthen confidence in the integrity of the treaty, particularly in 
     the face of the first withdrawal announced by a state. 
  2) You must ensure that measures for compliance are made more effective, for 
     example, by universalization of the Model Additional Protocol. 
  3) You must act to reduce the threat of prolifération not only to states, but to 
      non-states actors. 
  4) You must expedite agreements o create incentives for states to voluntarily 
     forego the development of fuel cycle facilities. 
  5) You must take the initial steps for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Prompt 
     negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty for all states is vital and 
     indispensable. AIl states hould reaffirm their commitment to a moratorium
5) The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Address to the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
   Treaty Review Conférence in New York, SG/SM/9847, DC/2956, 2 May 2005.
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     on testing, and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
     Ban Treaty. All nuclear-weapon states should de-alert their existing 
      weapons, and give negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon 
      states. 
  Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director-General of the IAEA, states, "While our 
twin goals - security and development - remain the same, our mechanisms for 
achieving those goals must evolve," and recommends the following measures:6) 
  1) We should re-affirm the goals we established for ourselvesin 1970, that is, 
      nuclear disarmament, non-prolifération and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
  2) We must strengthen the IAEA's verification authority through the additional 
     protocol and effective export control. 
  3) We need better control overprolifération sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel 
     cycle: activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. 
  4) We must secure and control nuclear material by improving physical 
     protection of nuclear material. 
  5) Nuclear-weapon states could make further irreversible reduction in their 
     existing arsenals, and reduce the strategic role currently given to nuclear 
      weapons. 
  6) Our verification efforts must be backed by an effective mechanism for 
     dealing with non-compliance through reliance on the Security Council. 
  7) We should use all mechanisms within our reach to address the security 
     concerns of all. The conférence should encourage the establishment of 
      additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas such as the Middle East and
     the Korean Peninsula. 
  As is clear from the statements of these two leaders, the issues that should be 
reviewed and discussed are multiple and complex. In particular, it is evident that 
new issues have emerged in the area of non-prolifération and peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. 
  The United States argues for a discussion focused on non-compliance with non-
prolifération norms while ignoring the issue of nuclear disarmament, stating that 
"Today
, the treaty is facing the most serious challenge in its history due to instances 
of noncompliance. Some continue to use the pretext of a peaceful nuclear program 
to pursue the goal of developing nuclear weapons. This conférence provides an 
opportunity for us to demonstrate our resolve in reaffirming our collective
6) Mohamed ElBaradei, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2005 Review 
   Conférence, United Nations, New York, General Debate, 2 May 2005.
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determination that noncompliance with the treaty's core nonproliferation orms is a 
clear threat o international peace and security." 7
  France, likewise, emphasizes the aspect of non-prolifération rather than nuclear 
disarmament, stating: "Since our last review conférence, profound changes have 
taken place in the world. ...Marked to a great extent by the Cold War, it was 
understandable that the proceedings of the 1995 Review and Extension Conférence 
and of the 2000 Review Conférence should have been largely devoted to the 
implementation of Article VI of the treaty. The priority in 2005 is to meet the 
serious challenges constituted by the prolifération crises that are a threat to 
international peace and security.8) 
  Almost all other states argue for a balanced iscussion on the three pillars of the 
treaty, that is, nuclear non-prolifération, uclear disarmament and the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy. Not only the non-nuclear-weapon states, but also the U.K., 
Russia and China argue for discussion on all the issues. For example, the New 
Agenda Coalition (NAC) states that "The NPT is the essential bedrock within our 
global security regime. The three pillars of the NPT - non-prolifération, uclear 
disarmament and peaceful uses - have been indispensable in attracting its near 
universal membership. Indeed, without each one of those pillars there would not 
have been a treaty."9) 
  Regarding the strong interconnection between non-prolifération and 
disarmament, Japan states that "In order to reinforce the authority and credibility of 
this regime, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states must 
implement heir obligations and commitments under the treaty, and promote both 
nuclear non-prolifération and disarmament."1O)
Procedural Matters - Provisional Agenda and Subsidiary Bodies




Statement by Stephan G. Rademaker, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control 
to the 2005 Review Conférence of the NPT, New York, May 2, 2005. 
Statement by H. E. Mr. François Rivasseau, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to 
the Conference on Disarmament, 2005 Review Conférence of the State Parties to the NPT, New 
York, May 5, 2005. 
Statement by Hon. Marian Hobbs, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, New Zealand on 
Behalf of the New Agenda Coalition - Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and 
New Zealand, 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, 2 May 2005.
10) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine, Representative of Japan to the NPT Review
Conference in 2005 at the Plenary Meeting of Main Committee 1, 19 May 2005.
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conférence was unable to reach agreement on a provisional agenda. Informai 
consultation between the third session and the conférence could not produce any 
compromise. As a result, the 2005 conférence started without an agenda. 
   The main reason why states parties could not agree on a provisional agenda is 
that the U.S. was reluctant o have any reference to the outcomes of the previous 
review conférences in an agenda. The U.S. treats the outcome of the previous 
review conférences, in particular the thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament, as no 
longer effective because the international security environment has radically 
changed. The U.S. also wants the discussion at the conférence to focus on the issue 
of non-compliance. However, almost ail other states, in particular the NAM states, 
considered the outcome of the previous conférences as a base for discussion at the 
2005 conférence. 
  In the case of the 2000 review conférence, the agenda on this subject was as 
follows: Review of the operation of the treaty as provided for in its Article VIII, 
paragraph 3, taking into account he decisions and the resolution adopted by the 
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conférence. If you follow this example, an 
agenda in 2005 would be: Review of the operation of the treaty as provided for in 
its Article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account he decisions and the resolution 
adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conférence and the final 
document adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conférence. 
  Although the conférence started and the general debate began on May 2, the 
states parties could not agree on an agenda. As a result, three main committees 
could not be established and substantive discussion that was scheduled to start on 
May 5 did not begin. On the last day of the first week, May 6, the President 
submitted his own draft agenda to the plenary meeting. Although it was highly 
expected that the draft would be accepted, Egypt lodged an objection to it and 
consultation continued. 
  The provisional agenda submitted by the President on May 6 includes only 
"Review of the operation of the Treaty
," without any reference to the outcomes of 
the previous conférences, but a President's statement was attached to it as a note, 
that reads: "It is understood that the review will be conducted in the light of the 
decisions and the resolution of previous Conferences, and allow for discussion of 
any issue raised by states parties." 
  Egypt's proposed amendment was to change "in the light of' into "taking into 
account" and to insert "and the outcomes" after "the resolution." The first 
amendment is intended to use the came words as in 2000 Review Conférence, and 
the second one is intended to make the reference to the 2000 final document
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clearer, in addition to the reference to the 1995 decisions and resolution. 
  Consultation continued in the second week, and on Wednesday, May 11, as 
Egypt withdrew its amendment, the original President's provisional agenda with the 
attached statement of the President was adopted.(1) At that time, Malaysia, on 
behalf of the NAM states, submitted a document that included ils interpretation of 
the agenda. It says: "The agenda establishes the framework for conducting the 
review of the operation of the treaty in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3 of 
the treaty, the decisions and the resolution of previous conférences, in particular the 
1995 Review and Extension conférence and the decision of the 2000 review 
conférence to adopt by consensus its final document." 12} 
  Although the agenda was agreed, the issues of allocation of items to the main 
committees and the establishment of subsidiary bodies remained. As a result, the 
main committees were not established and no substantive discussion started. By 
the end of the second week, when half of the conférence terra had passed, an 
agreement had not yet been achieved. 
  The allocation of items does not seem so difficult as it is simply allocation of 
new items among the three Main Committees. In accordance with the President's 
draft, the issues of disarmament and non-prolifération education, and institutional 
issues will be dealt with respectively in the Main Committee I and in the Main 
Committee II. The issue of withdrawal will be deait with under other provisions of 
the treaty in the Main Committee III. 
  On the establishment of subsidiary bodies, the NAM had proposed to establish 
subsidiary bodies to consider, respectively, issues related to nuclear disarmament, 
security assurances and regional issues with particular reference to the 1995 
resolution on the Middle East.13) The President's draft provides for the 
establishment of subsidiary body 1 under the Main Committee I that will focus on 
nuclear disarmament and security assurances, subsidiary body 2 under the Main 
Committee II that will examine the regional issues, including with respect to the 
Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution, and subsidiary 
body 3 under the Main Committee III that will address other provisions of the 
treaty, including Article X. 
  Finally, on May 18, Wednesday of the third week, the President's drafts were 
accepted, with agreement on allocation of items to the Main Committees of the
11) NPT/CONF.2005/30, 11 May 2005, NPT/CONF.2005/31,12 May 2005. 
12) NPT/CONF.2005/32, 12 May 2005. 
13) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.17, 2 May 2005.
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Conférence 14) and decision on subsidiary bodies. 15) The allocation of items follows 
the previous conférences and additionally adds disarmament and non-prolifération 
education to the Main Committee I and institutional issues to the Main Committee 
II. The issue of withdrawal was included in the mandate of the subsidiary body 3. 
  It was decided that the Chairman of each subsidiary body would be elected by 
the NAC, the Western group, and the NAM respectively. Allocation of sessions for 
subsidiary bodies within each Main Committee was also confrontational, and it had 
been proposed that five sessions for subsidiary body 1, four sessions for body 2, 
and three sessions for body 3 within seven sessions for each Main Committee. 
However, the Président proposed to follow the pattern of allocation in the 2000 
Review Conférence in a balanced manner, and this proposal was accepted. Finally, 
substantive discussion in each Main Committee and subsidiary body started on May 
19. 
  Dispute on the agenda again happened at the end of the conférence when the 
drafting committee submitted its draft final document. It included the full text of 
both statements of the President and the NAM in connection with review of the 
operation of the treaty. The U.K. lodged an objection and asked to delete the 
statement of the NAM. After informai consultation, it was agreed that the full text 
of the statement of the President would remain but the full text of the statement of 
the NAM would be deleted and only note of the statement and its document number 
would remain. 
  As is clear from the examination above, the 2005 conférence spent most of its 
time on the resolution of procedural matters. Superficially it was a confrontation on 
procedural matters, but substantially it was a confrontation on substantive matters, 
such as what is the objective of the review at the conférence, what should be 
discussed at the conférence, what is the current threat to the international 
community, and what outcomes were expected from the conférence. There was a 
great différence of opinion on these questions.
Arguments at the Main Committees
  The time for substantive discussions in the Main Committees was reduced to 
only five days because they started on May 19 and ended on May 25, with the last 
two days reserved for the plenary sessions. Six formai sessions were allocated to
14) NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1, 18 May 2005. 
15) NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.2, 18 May 2005.
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each Main Committee, and two within six were allocated for each subsidiary body. 
In reality, as additional informai meetings were held in each Main Committee and 
subsidiary body, the actual time for discussion was longer than the formai 
allocation time. 
  The Main Committee I deals with non-prolifération of nuclear weapons, 
disarmament and international peace and security as well as security assurances and 
subsidiary body 1 focuses on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. During 
the sessions of Main Committee I, issues relating to Articles I and II and 
disarmament and non-prolifération education were discussed based on the 
chairman's draft working paper. At the subsidiary body 1, the issues of nuclear 
disarmament and security assurances were discussed based on the chairman's 
paper. 
  The last session was held in the morning on May 25, when it was clear that it 
would be impossible to reach agreement on a working paper. The Committee was 
not able to reach a consensus on the text of the Chairman's working paper of the 
Main Committee I and the working paper of the Chairman of subsidiary body 1 as 
they didn't reflect the views of ail states parties. Nevertheless, the Committee 
agreed to annex the papers to its report. As a result, the final document includes the 
chairman's working papers which were not agreed to by the full committee. 
  The Main Committee II deals with the issues of non-prolifération of nuclear 
weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and subsidiary body 2 
examines regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and 
implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. Discussion in the Main 
Committee II produced consensus in part but not entirely, and no consensus 
emerged in the debate in subsidiary body 2 where ail sentences were bracketed. 
Although it was proposed to send the bracketed working paper to the plenary, 
finally it was decided at the last session in the afternoon on May 24 that the report 
from the Main Committee II includes only procedural matters and no substantive 
matters. 
  The Main Committee III deals with the inalienable right to develop, research, 
produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and subsidiary body 3 
addresses other provisions of the treaty, including Article X. Article X relates to 
the issue of withdrawal. In the discussion under the Main Committee III, a 
considerable part of the working paper reached consensus, but sharp confrontation 
appeared over the issues of universality and withdrawal. The possibility to send the 
bracketed working paper to the plenary was pursued, but finally it was decided not 
to send it.
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  As a result, the final document of the 2005 Review Conférence includes only 
procedural proceedings, with the exception of the chairman's working paper from 
the Main Committee I that was not agreed upon.
Nuclear Disarmament
Nuclear Disarmament in General
  All five nuclear-weapon states declare that they are abiding in good faith by the 
obligations under Article VI. The U.S. states that "The United States remains fully 
committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI. Since the last review 
conférence the United States and the Russian Federation concluded our 
implementation of START I reductions, and signed and brought into force the 
Moscow Treaty of 2002. In addition, we have reduced our non-strategic nuclear 
weapons by 90% since the end of the Cold War. We have also reduced the role of 
nuclear weapons in our deterrence strategy."16) 
  Russia states that "The Russian Federation is committed to its obligation under 
the Treaty, including to the nuclear disarmament measures. Russia fulfilled its 
obligations under the START to reduce strategic nuclear arms. By now, Russia has 
eut down its arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons fourfold. The US-Russian 
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions has become a new significant step toward 
nuclear disarmament." 17) 
  The U.K. states that "The UK is fully committed to all our obligations under the 
Treaty and we recognize that we have particular obligations, as a nuclear-weapon 
state, under Article VI of the Treaty. We re-affirrn our unequivocal undertaking to 
accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear 
disarmament. We continue te, make progress on nuclear disarmament. Since the 
end of the Cold War the United Kingdom has reduced the explosive power of its 
nuclear forces by more than 70%."18) 
  France states that "Since it acceded to the NPT, France has taken, in the field of 
nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, decisions whose 
scope all States Parties are aware of. On the occasion of this Review Conférence,
16) Statement by Stephan G. Rademaker. (note 7) 
17) Statement by H. E. Sergey 1. Kislyak, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
   Federation at the Review Conférence of the Parties to the NPT, New York, May 3, 2005. 
18) Statement by Ambassador John Freeman, Head of the UK Delegation to the Seventh Review 
   Conférence of the NPT, New York, May 2005.
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my country is intent on reaffirming its commitments under Article VI of the Treaty. 
It signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1998; it has dismantled its nuclear 
testing centre in the Pacifie. France has also drastically eut its nuclear arsenal."19) 
  China states that "As a nuclear-weapon state, China has never shunned its 
responsibility in nuclear disarmament. The Chinese Government has always 
supported a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, 
exercised utmost restraint in developing nuclear weapons. China has never taken 
part, and will not do so, in any nuclear arms race."20) 
  As is clear from the statements above by the five nuclear-weapon states, they all 
strongly argue that hey are committed tothe obligations under Article VI. In order 
to highlight heir own activities towards nuclear disarmament, they all submitted 
reports or pamphlets that show how sincerely they are working for nuclear 
disarmament.21) However, these reports amount o propaganda about heir own 
activities in this field. It is necessary to judge their reports or pamphlets 
objectively, as they do not touch upon what hey are not doing, that is, the Jack of 
effort in nuclear disarmament. 
  The most remarkable among the statements by the five nuclear-weapon states i  
China's, which criticizes the actions of other states. Highlighting threats to 
international security, China lists the abandonment of he ABM Treaty, danger of 
weaponization f outer space, lack of entry into force of the CTBT, stalemate of
international arms control and disarmament, and paralyzed CD with no starting of 
negotiations of the FMCT and PAROS. Focusing on negative developments, China 
refers to the lingering Cold War mentality, unilateralism, advocating pre-emptive 
strategy, listing other countries as targets of nuclear strikes, lowering the threshold 
for using nuclear weapons, and researching and developing new types of nuclear 
weapons for specific purposes.22) 
  On the other hand, the NAC is skeptical of the progress innuclear disarmament, 
stating, "We eall on China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United
19) Statement by H. E. Mr. François Rivasseau. (note 8) 
20) Statement by Mr. Zhang Yan, Head of the Chinese Delegation in the General Debate at the 2005 
   NPT Review Conférence, May 3, 2005, New York. 
21) The U.S. submitted The Commitnzent of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty 
   on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2005. Russia submitted Practical Steps taken by 
   the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament, New York, 2005. The U.K. 
   submitted Strengthening Non-Proliferation: The 2005 NPT Review Conference. France submitted 
   Fighting Proliferation, Pronioting Amis Control and Disarmament: France's Contribution, 2005. 
   China submitted Chinas Contributions to Nuclear Disarmament. 
22) Statement by Mr. Zhang Yan. (note 20)
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States to honour their obligations towards nuclear disarmament. Thirty-five or 
more years ago the international community agreed that "effective measures" 
would be undertaken to achieve nuclear disarmament. Measured in terras of their 
promise, we had high hopes for the agreed outcomes of the last two Review 
Conférences. In terms of the fulfillment of those outcomes we are greatly 
disappointed.',23) 
  The NAM expressed its deep concern, stating that "The Non-Aligned Movement 
whose members make up a large majority of the States Parties to the NPT, wishes 
to reaffirm the importance of achieving the total elimination of all weapons of mass 
destruction globally, in particular nuclear weapons. While recognizing recent 
moves by nuclear-weapon states that could lead towards disarmament, we reiterate 
our deep concern over the slow pace of progress in this regard. ,24) 
  Sweden is rather critical of the progress on nuclear disarmament, stating that 
"Only limited progress has been made towards nuclear disarmament. There are 
even worrying signs pointing in the opposite direction. One nuclear weapon state is 
modernizing its nuclear arsenals, another is planning research on new nuclear 
warheads, a third has announced its intension to develop new delivery vehicles for 
nuclear weapons."25) 
  Canada is also critical, stating that "Progress on nuclear disarmament has been 
compromised by the protracted impasse in the Conférence on Disarmament. The 
specific assignments given it by the NPT's 2000 Review Conférence, namely to 
negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and to establish a subsidiary body on 
nuclear disarmament remain unfulfilled."26) 
  One of the most controversial points in the discussion is whether to take into 
account he outcomes of the previous review conférences, just as Japan states that 
"35 years after the NPT's entry into force
, we must once again recall: our 
obligations under Article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on disarmament 
measures; our commitment to the 1995 decision on 'Principles and Obligations,' an 
integral part of a package with the NPT indefinite extension; and the 'unequivocal
23) Statement by Hon. Marian Hobbs. (note 9) 
24) Statement by the Hon. Syed Hamid Alber, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia on Behalf of 
   the Group of Non-aligned States Parties to the NPT at the General Debate of the 2005 Review 
   Conférence of the Parties to the NPT, 3 May 2005, New York. 
25) Statement by H. E. Laila Freivalds, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 2005 Review 
   Conférence of the Parties to the NPT, United Nations, New York, 3 May 2005. 
26) Statement by Mr. Jim Wright, Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister, International 
   Security Branch of Canada to the 2005 NPT Review Conférence, New York, 2 May 2005.
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undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons,' one of the 13 
practical steps agreed upon in the 2000 Final Document."27) Almost all states 
discussed the issue by taking into account the outcomes of the previous 
conférences, while only the U.S. entirely refrained from referring to previous 
outcomes. 
  At the preparatory committees in 2002, the U.S. stated that "The United States 
no longer supports some of the Article VI conclusions in the Final Document from 
the 2000 NPT Review Conférence. A prominent example of this is the ABM 
Treaty and another example of a treaty we no longer support is the CTBT."28) In 
2003 it stated that "While the United States no longer supports all 13 steps, we 
unambiguously support Article VI and the goal of nuclear disarmament."291 This 
position was criticized severely by many non-nuclear-weapon states. 
  The U.S. posture moved further against nuclear disarmament in 2004, when the 
U.S. declared that it had completely committed to the obligations under Article VI 
and had no problem in its implementation.30) The U.S. denied any reference to the 
outcomes of the previous review conférences, stating that "Review Conférences are 
not amendment conférences, and any declarations or decisions or other text 
emanating from them neither supercede, nor reinterpret, nor add onto the explicit 
legal obligations of all parties under the Treaty."31D 
  The other controversial issue is the relationship between nuclear disarmament 
and general and complete disarmament. Many states, in particular non-nuclear-
weapon states, demand that priority should be given to nuclear disarmament though 
Article VI includes reference to a treaty on general and complete disarmament, 
because the NPT is a treaty on nuclear weapons and the central obligation under 
Article VI is nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, France argues, both at the 
preparatory committees and the Review Conférence, that nuclear disarmament is 
possible only within the framework of general and complete disarmament and 
refuses to give priority to nuclear disarmament. At the 2005 Review Conférence, 
the U.S. supported this position.
27) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine. (note 10) 
28) Statement by Ambassador Eric C. Javis, Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the Conférence 
   on Disarmament, April 11, 2002. 
29) Information Paper from the United States concerning Article VI of the NPT, 1 May 2003. 
30) Statement by John Bolton. (note 3) 
31) Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the 
   Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the 2005 Review Conférence of the NPT, U.S. 
   Implementation of Article VI and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament, Main Committee I, New 
   York, May 2005.
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  Argument on nuclear disarmament was conducted at the subsidiary body 1 
established under the Main Committee 1. The Chairman first submitted his first 
version of a draft working paper and discussion was conducted based on it. Then 
he submitted his second version by taking account of the arguments, and then 
discussion continued until he submitted his third and final version. Naturally there 
was no consensus on many parts of the chairman's draft because there was not 
enough time to discuss the issues deeply, but more significantly there was a sharp 
confrontation on many issues. In spite of the fact that the final version of the 
chairman's draft could not get consensus upport, it was decided that the draft 
would be sent to the Plenary Meeting as an annex to the report of the Main 
Committee I.
  Regarding nuclear disarmament in general, the working paper of the chairman 
of the subsidiary body 1 includes the following paragraphs. 
  1. The Conférence remains alarmed by the continued threat to humanity 
posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, reaffirms the need to make every 
effort to avert the danger to all mankind of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism 
and to take measures to saféguard the security of peoples. 
  2. The Conférence recalls the Principles, Objectives and Undertakings for 
Nuclear Non-Prolifération and Disarmament including the principles of 
irreversibility, transparency, verifiability and undiminished security for all. 
  3. The Conférence recalls the commitment to pursue effective measures 
and make systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI including 
the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the 
total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and other steps. 
  The U.S. opposes the second paragraph on the principles and demands to delete 
it in its entirety. On the third paragraph, the U.S. demands the deletion of "and 
make systematic and progressive fforts" and delete "including the unequivocal 
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of 
their nuclear arsenals, and other steps."32)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
  In the general debate, almost all states referred the issue, asking for the early 
entry into force of the CTBT and the maintenance of a moratorium on nuclear 
testing, just as is stipulated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conférence.
32) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.62, 27 May 2005.
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  First, on the early entry into force, some states argue just for its early entry into 
force, but others ask the eleven states whose ratification is needed for its entry into 
force but have not ratified it to sign and ratify the treaty. Russia, the U.K. and 
France have already ratified it and ask for its early entry into force. China has 
signed but not ratified it, and states that it supports an early entry into force of the 
CTBT and is now working actively on its internai legal proceedings for ratifying 
the treaty.33) The NAC, the NAM, the European Union and Japan also support and 
demand its early entry into force. The U.S., which did not refer to this issue in the 
general debate, stated in the Main Committee I that "The United States does not 
support he Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and will not become a party 
to it."34) 
  The NAM regrets the fact that one nuclear-weapon state has taken the decision 
not to proceed with the ratification of the CTBT and suggests that positive 
decisions by the nuclear-weapon states would have the desired impact on the 
progress towards its entry into force. 35) Japan states that "We must recall that the 
CTBT is an integral part of the 1995 package to allow the indefinite extension of 
the NPT,"36) and Austria also states that "the conclusion of a CTBT was an 
essential element in gaining support from non-nuclear-weapon states for the 
indefinite extension of the NPT at the Review and Extension Conférence in 
1995."37) The working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden emphasizes 
that the CTBT was an integral part of the indefinite xtension of the NPT.38) 
  Second, on the testing moratorium, almost ail states argue for the maintenance 
of the moratorium until the CTBT enters into force. The NAM underscores the 
importance of the five nuclear-weapon states maintaining their voluntary 
moratoriums, but believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, 
ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. The NAM further emphasizes that 
the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given 
by the five nuclear-weapon states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, 
namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear
33) Statement by Mr. Zhang Yan. (note 20) 
34) Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders. (note 31) 
35) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
36) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine. (note 10) 
37) Statement by Ambassador Wernfried Koeffler, Head of Delegation of Austria, 2005 NPT Review 
   Conférence, New York, 4 May 2005. 
38) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.9, 26 May 2005.
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weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.39) 
  The U.S. did not refer to the testing moratorium, but in a pamphlet 40) distributed 
during the conférence it states that "the NPR did not call for a resumption of 
testing. The United States has maintained and confirmed its moratorium. It has no 
plans to conduct nuclear tests. The enhanced test readiness program is not a signal 
of an intension to resume testing." At the Main Committee I, the U.S. stated that 
"the U.S. has not conducted a nuclear test rince 1992, continues to observe its 
nuclear testing moratorium, has no plans to conduct a nuclear test, and encourages 
others not to test."41) 
  Third, on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), 
many states expressed support for the work of the CTBTO in preparation of its 
entry into force, mainly in the field of verification, even though the Treaty has not 
entered into force. For example, Japan states that efforts to develop the CTBT 
verification regime, including the International Monitoring System (IMS), should 
also be continued.42) The U.K. will continue to play an active role in the 
establishment of the verification system for the CTBT,43) and the EU highlights the 
importance of the work of the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission, 44) and 
the NAC welcomes the importance of maintaining the moratorium towards the 
early establishment of the CTBTO in order to build the verification regime.45) Even 
the U.S. expresses its willingness to continue to work with the Provisional 
Technical Secretariat on IMS-related activities.46) 
  Under the first draft of the chairman, the CTBT was treated in two separate 
paragraphs that urged States Parties to "recall the importance and urgency of early 
entry into force of the CTBT", and "pending entry into force of relevant reaties, 
reaffirm or declare on testing of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices." 
The second and third versions are the same, stating as follows: 
  9. In looking forward to the entry into force of the Comprehensive
39) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
40) The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the 
   Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2005, p.5. 
41) Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders. (note 31) 
42) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine. (note 10) 
43) Statement by Ambassador John Freeman. (note 18) 
44) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nicolas Schmit, Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg on 
   Behalf of the European Union, General Debate, 2005 Review Conférence of the States Partiesto 
   the NPT, New York, 2 May 2005. 
45) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005. 
46) Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders. (note 31)
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Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Conférence welcomes efforts since 2000 against 
the testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including 
through maintenance of the existing moratoria, support for the preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 
progress made in developing the International Monitoring System, and the 
increased membership of the Treaty. 
  Initially, the U.S. opposed the phrases "the early entry into force of the CTBT" 
and "the increased membership of the Treaty," but finally demanded to delete the 
paragraph in its entirely.47) Many states asked the concemed states to ratify the 
Treaty as soon as possible, just as the Japanese proposa 08) and the Japanese-
Australian proposal49) demand that the Conférence urge all states that have not yet 
ratified the CTBT, in particular those 11 states whose ratification is required for it 
to enter into force, to do so at the earliest opportunity. The NAC suggests that all 
states hould spare no efforts to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT,5(» 
and the NAM believes that the five nuclear-weapon states have a special 
responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT.51)
Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
  Negotiations on an FMCT bas not yet started in spite of the fact that ten years 
ago the states parties agreed on the immediate commencement and early conclusion 
of negotiations on an FMCT, and five years ago they agreed to the immediate 
commencement of negotiations on an FMCT with a view to their conclusion within 
Pive years. 
  At the 2005 conférence, virtually every state urged the immediate 
commencement of the negotiation on an FMCT. The Pive nuclear-weapon states 
support its immediate commencement in principle; the U.S. states that "we have 
called upon the Conférence on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on an 
FMCT."52) Russia reiterated its position in favor of the earliest possible beginning 
of negotiations on an FMCT,53) the U.K. looks forward to the early negotiation,
47) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.62, 27 May 2005. 
48) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21, 4 May 2005. 
49) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.34, 19 May 2005. 
50) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005. 
51) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
52) Statement by Rademaker, (note 7) 
53) Statement by H. E. Mr. Sergey I. Kislyak. (note 17)
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without preconditions, in the CD of a FMCT,54) France encourages the launch of 
negotiations on an FMCT,55) and China demands efforts to reach agreement on the 
negotiation of an FMCT.56) 
  Japan urges an early commencement of negotiations, on an FMCT,57) the EU 
appeals to the CD for the immediate commencement of an FMCT,58) the NAC 
urges resumption in the CD of negotiations of an FMCT59j, and the NAM urges the 
CD to agree a programme of work that includes negotiations of an FMCT.60) There 
exists a general consensus on the immediate commencement of the negotiations of 
an FMCT. 
  Some states argue for the maintenance of a moratorium on the production of 
fissile material for weapon purposes until an FMCT is concluded. This was not 
agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conférence because of strong opposition by China. 
Japan calls upon all nuclear-weapon states and the non-NPT states to declare 
moratoriums on the production of fissile materials for any nuclear weapons pending 
the entry into force of an FMCT,61) the U.S. calls to join it in declaring a 
moratorium,62) and the NAC also calls for the upholding and maintenance of a 
moratorium.63) 
  More precisely, the EU calls on China to join the other NWS to declare a 
moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and to abstain 
from any increase of its nuclear arsenal,64) and Australia urges China, India, 
Pakistan and Israel to apply a moratorium.65) 
  The first confronting pointis a linkage with other issues. The CD could not start 
the negotiation of an FMCT for a long time mainly because China demanded a
strong linkage with the commencement of the negotiation of PARAS, but China 
agreed to abstain from the stringent linkage in 2003. However, at the 2005 Review
54) Statement by Ambassador John Freeman. (note 18) 
55) Statement by H. E. Mr. François Rivasseau. (note 8) 
56) Statement by Mr. Zhang Yan. (note 20) 
57) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nobutaka Machimura, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the 2005 
   Review Conférence of the Parties to the NPT, 2 May 2005, New York. 
58) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nicholas Schmit. (note 44) 
59) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005. 
60) NPT/CONF.2005/WP. 18, 2 May 2005. 
61) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine. (note 10) 
62) Statement by Stephan G. Rademaker. (note 7) 
63) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005. 
64) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nichlas Schmit. (note 44) 
65) Statement by the Hon. Alexander Dower MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, 2005 
   Review Conférence of the Parties to the NPT, 2 May 2005.
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Conférence, nome states argued for a softer linkage. Russia stated that "I wish to 
reiterate our position in favor of the earliest possible beginning, at the CD, 
negotiations on a treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. We also support the idea of establishing ad hoc 
Committees within the CD framework to deal with nuclear disarmament issues and 
negative security assurances. In fact, we need to reach a comprehensive 
compromise on the CD programme of work that would finally unblock its practical 
disarmament activities. We are open to such compromises."66) 
  China also states that "In the CD, efforts should be made to reach agreement on 
the program of work so as to start the negotiation of FMCT at an early date, as well 
as establish the ad hoc committees and start substantive work on nuclear 
disarmament, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states and non-
weaponization of the outer space."67) The NAM asks the CD to agree on a 
programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on 
an FMCT, and at the same time it calls to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear 
disarmament and emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive 
work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.68)
  Other states do not mention the linkage and it seems that they want to start the 
negotiation on an FMCT independently if possible. The U.S. is clear on this point, 
stating: "We hope that FMCT negotiations can begin in the CD without conditions 
or linkages to other issues."69) 
  The second controversial point is on the issue of verification. The Shannon 
mandate agreed to in 1995 and maintained rince, states clearly that "a non-
discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty" is 
necessary. This is an agreed condition on an FMCT and verification is thought to 
be necessary and possible. However, in July 2004, the U.S. argued for the 
negotiation of an FMCT without verification, stating that "The U.S. policy review 
raised serious concerns that realistic, effective verification of an FMCT is not 
achievable."70) At the 2005 Review Conférence, the U.S. demanded negotiation of 
an FMCT without verification,71) and the U.K. urged the early negotiation, without
66) Statement by H. E. Mr. Sergey 1. Kislyak. (note 17) 
67) Statement by Mr. Zhang Yan. (note 20) 
68) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
69) The Conznlihnent of the United States ofAnierica. (note 40), p.11. 
70) "Sanders Says Verification of Fissile Cutoff Treaty Not Achievable," USINFO.STATE.GOV 
   [http://usinfo. state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Aug/06-640593.htinl] 
71) Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders. (note 31)
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preconditions, of an FMCT.72) The other three nuclear-weapon states do not touch 
upon the issue of verification. Japan, Canada, Sweden and Germany do not 
necessarily refer to the issue of verification either. 
  On the other hand, the NAM and the NAC urged the negotiation of an FMCT 
with verification in accordance with the Shannon mandate, an internationally and 
effectively verifiable treaty, and the NAM expressed concern over attempts to limit 
the scope of the negotiations on an FMCT.73) Australia suggested that the FMCT 
should include measures to verify that parties are complying with their 
obligations, 74) stating that an FMCT without a robust verification regime would be 
devoid of its purpose.75) The EU attached special importance to the negotiation of a 
non-discriminatory and universal Treaty banning the production of such fissile 
material without preconditions while bearing in mind the special coordinator's 
report and the mandate contained therein.76) 
  An appropriate subsidiarybody with a mandate to deal with nuclear 
disarmament was agreed to in the 2000 final document but has not been established 
yet. Russia and China advocate the establishment of the subsidiary body in 
connection with the ad hoc committee to negotiate an FMCT, and the NAC and the 
NAM also strongly urge its establishment. The NAM reiterates its call to establish, 
as soon as possible, and as a high priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear 
disarmament hat would negotiate a phased programme for the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear 
weapons convention. 77) Canada touches upon this issue as well, but the U.S., the 
U.K., France, Japan and the EU do not refer to this issue. 
  The first version of the chairman's draft does not directly refer to an FMCT but 
provides that "pledge urgent efforts to pursue and implement options for enhanced 
multilateral and other action on nuclear disarmament, including compliance aspects, 
such as the negotiation of additional international instruments reinforcing the 
objectives and work of the Treaty." It also writes that "pending entry into force of 
relevant reaties, reaffirm or declare moratorium on production of fissile materials 
for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices." Many states criticize to the 
first part because it is very ambiguous and not understandable. The second and the
72) Statement by Ambassador John Freeman. (note 18) 
73) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
74) Statement by the Hon, Alexander Downer NP. (note 65) 
75) Statement by Ambassador Wernfried Koeffler. (note 37) 
76) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nicolas Schmit. (note 44) 
77) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005.
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third versions are provided for as follows: 
  10. The Conférence pledges urgent efforts, especially in the Conference on 
Disarmament, to pursue and implement options for enhanced multilateral and 
other action on nuclear disarmament, including compliance aspects, and 
appeals to ail members of the Conference on Disarmament to demonstrate the 
necessary flexibility to enable adoption of a programme of work that will 
advance crucial NPT-related tasks. 
  The Chairman's working paper remains very abstract without mentioning an 
FMCT. In that sense, it seems to be retrogression from the agreement at the 2000 
Review Conference as it lacks direct reference to an ad hoc committee on an FMCT 
and a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament. A Japan-Australia proposai 
reaffirms the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiation and its early 
conclusion, the NAC and the NAM urge to start negotiations on an FMCT and 
establish a subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament at the CD, and in addition, the 
NAM calls for negotiation on PAROS. China urges negotiation on nuclear 
disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in 
outer space as well as an FMCT. Russia requests the establishment of ad hoc 
committee on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances as well as an 
FMCT. The U.S. bas no comment on this paragraph. 
  The fact that the Chairman's working paper is extremely ambiguous and abstract 
means that it is now extremely difficult to find a common position on the program 
of work at the CD, because there is much différence of opinion based on the current 
international security environment. On the other hand, it is the expression of 
Chairman's willingness to stress the necessity of agreement in the CD on a program 
of work that would advance NPT-relevant issues without going into specifics of 
mandate.
Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons
  The final document of the 2000 Review Conference includes "the early entry 
into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III 
as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty." 
However, the Bush administration abandoned the START process and withdrew 
from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The U.S. states that "The United States remains 
fully committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI. Since the last review 
conférence the United States and the Russian Federation concluded our 
implementation of START 1 reductions, and signed and brought into force the
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Moscow Treaty of 2002. Under the Moscow Treaty, we have agreed to reduce our 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200, about a third of 
the 2002 levels, and less than a quarter of the level at the end of the Cold War. 
When this Treaty is fully implemented by the end of 2012, the United States will 
have reduced the number of strategic nuclear warheads it had deployed in 1990 by 
about 80%."78) Russia states that "The Russian Federation is committed to its 
obligations under the Treaty, including to the nuclear disarmament measures. 
Russia fulfilled its obligations under the START to reduce strategic nuclear arms. 
The US-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions has become a new 
significant step towards nuclear disarmament."79) 
  However, the NAM remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards 
achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. While noting the signing of the 
Moscow Treaty, the NAM stresses that reductions in deployments and in 
operational status cannot take the place of irreversible cuts in, and the total 
elimination of, nuclear weapons. The non-entry into force of START II is a setback 
to the 13 practical steps. The Group calls for the application of the principles of 
irreversibility and increased transparency.80) The NAC criticizes that the majority 
of weapons reductions are not irreversible, transparent, or verifiable.81)
  As an intermediary, Japan highly values the Moscow Treaty and encourages 
both Russia and the U.S. to work towards its full implementation and to consider 
building on the Treaty to realize further reductions. Japan also calls upon all 
nuclear-weapon states to take further steps towards nuclear disarmament.82) The 
EU welcomes the Moscow Treaty, but emphasizes the importance of the principles 
of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability. The EU expects further reductions 
in the Russian and US arsenals.83) 
  Although the ABM Treaty was treated as a cornerstone of strategic stability and 
as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons in the 2000 final 
document, it was abandoned with the unilateral withdrawal by the U.S. Related to 
this, China and the NAM urge the commencement of negotiations on PAROS in the 
CD, worrying about the possibility of a new arms race in outer space. 
  The Chairman's draft referred to this issue in two paragraphe: the first relates
78) Statement by Stephan G. Rademaker. (note 7) 
79) Statement by H. E. Mr. Sergey 1. Kislyak. (note 17) 
80) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
81) Statement by Hon. Marian Hobbs. (note 9) 
82) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine. (note 10) 
83) Staternent by H. E. Mr. Nicolas Schmit. (note 44)
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with the Moscow Treaty and the second with the reduction of nuclear weapons. 
The first paragraph of the first draft stipulates that states-parties "recognize the 
importance of the Moscow Treaty and seek sustained efforts to implement it." The 
second and third version is the saure, providing for as follows. 
  4. The Conférence recognises the importance of the Moscow Treaty and 
seeks sustained efforts to implement it, and urges its parties to undertake the 
reduction by 2012 to the lowest target number of nuclear warheads and by 
agreed timetables. 
  Many states referred to the shortcoming of the Moscow Treaty, but there was no 
objection on this paragraph including by the U.S. 
  The second paragraph on the reduction is as follows with minor changes from 
the Chairman's first draft. 
  5. Building upon the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review 
Conférences, the Conference urges more intensified progress by the nuclear-
weapon states in reducing or continuing to reduce their non-strategic and 
strategic nuclear arsenals. 
  Japan proposes that "The Conference agrees that the realization of a safe world 
free from of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper, more 
transparent and irreversible reductions in all types of nuclear weapons by all 
nuclear-weapon states as they work towards their complete elimination."84) The 
NAC calls upon the nuclear-weapon states to take further steps to reduce their non-
strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals. And the NAM urges a phased programme 
for the complete limination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame. 
  The U.S. demands to delete in its entirety, as the paragraph refers to the 
outcomes of the previous review conférences and urges the reduction of both non-
strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals. Russia also responds negatively.
Reduction of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
  The 2000 final document includes the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons. The Japanese proposal mentioned above refers to non-strategic nuclear 
weapons by calling upon all nuclear-weapon states to further reduce all types of 
nuclear weapons. The EU stresses the need to implement the declarations made by 
the Presidents of Russia and America in 1991 and 1992 on unilateral reductions in 
their stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons and calls on all states with non-
84) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21, 4 May 2005.
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strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms control and 
disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination.85) Germany, 
as a first step, proposes the complete implementation of the respective unilateral 
commitments that were made by the U.S. and Russia in 1991 and 1992 to reduce 
their sub-strategic nuclear arsenals. Its objective is to reduce and eliminate these 
weapons on all sides. Germany believes that increased transparency measures 
could be agreed upon that would account for these weapons. A further step could 
then be the formalization and verification of unilateral measures for reduction.86) 
Sweden, with a sense of urgency, calls on all countries possessing non-strategic 
weapons to engage in negotiations on further reductions with the subsequent aim of 
their total elimination, as a central non-prolifération concern is that terrorists may 
try to obtain them due to their relatively small size and the availability of delivery 
systems for such weapons.87) 
  On the other hand, the U.S. states that the U.S. has reduced its non-strategic 
nuclear weapons by 90% since the end of the Cold War, dismantling over 3,000 
such weapons pursuant o the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992,88) 
and Russia states that "The reduction of its non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons 
(TNW) represents a real contribution of the Russian Federation to the fulfillment of 
its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. By now the Russian TNWs are 
deployed only within national territory and concentrated atcentral storage facilities 
of the Ministry of Defense. All Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable control, 
with all necessary measures taken to avoid their unauthorized use. At the came 
Lime it is important o note that Russia's non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been 
reduced by four times as compared to what the Soviet Union possessed in 1991. 
We will further reduce the level of these weapons. This process will certainly be 
pursued with due account for the military and strategic situation and our national 
security interests."89) The U.K., France and China make no mention on this issue. 
  The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons is included in the paragraph 
mentioned above in connection with strategic nuclear weapons, providing for as 
follows:
85) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nicolas Schmit. (note 44) 
86) Speech by Joschka Fisher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany at the Opening 
   Session of the 7th Review Conférence of the Parties to the NPT, New York, 2 May 2005.
87) Statement by H. E. Ms. Laila Freivalds. (note 25) 
88) Statement by Stephan Rademaker. (note 7) 
89) National Report on the Implenmentation of the Non-Prolifération Treaty bi' the Russian 
   Federation.
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  5. Building upon the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review 
Conférences, the Conférence urges more intensified progress by the nuclear-
weapon states in reducing or continuing to reduce their non-strategic and 
strategic nuclear arsenals. 
  Regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons, another paragraph states as follows: 
  6. The Conférence affirms the value of full implementation of the 
Presidential Nuclear Initiative and of the extension of such a mechanism to ail 
states possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
  The U.S. demands to delete the phrase "and of the extension of such mechanism 
to ail states possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons."
A Diminishing Role of Nuclear Weapons
  The Japanese proposai is the same as the provision in the 2000 Final Document, 
stating "The Conférence reaffirms the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear 
weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that such weapons will ever be 
used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination."90» The New Agenda 
addresses the increasing concerns about the Jack of compliance and implementation 
of ail commitments made in the context of the NPT regime. In particular, the NAC 
addresses the troubling development that some nuclear-weapon states are 
researching or even planning to develop new or significantly modify existing 
nuclear weapons, and worries that these actions have the potential to create the 
conditions for a new nuclear arms race and would be contrary to the Treaty.91D 
  South Africa urges against the development of new types of nuclear weapons in 
accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their 
security policies,92) and Brazil states that "Although the NPT has no provision that 
expressly prohibit modernization of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, 
the introduction of new weapon types and the announcement of strategic doctrine 
that tend to lower the threshold for the utilization of nuclear weapons run counter to 
the 'unequivocal commitment' to fulfill nuclear disarmament, and bypasses the 
'thirteen practical steps' towards that goal adopted in 2000."93) The NAM remains
90) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21, 4 May 2005. 
91) Statement by Hon. Marian Hobbs. (note 9) 
92) Statement by the Republic of South Africa during the General Debate of the 2005 Review 
   Conférence of the States Parties te the NPT delivered by Mr. Abdul Samad Minty, Deputy 
   Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs, New York, 3 May 2005. 
93) Statement by the Head of Delegation of Brazil, Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, at VII Review 
   Conférence of the NPT, New York, 2 May 2005.
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deeply concerned by strategic defense doctrines that set out the rationales for the 
use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the 
nuclear-weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances in which these 
weapons could be used.94) 
  In the saureway, China criticizes U.S. policy, stating; "some negative 
developments, including sticking to the Cold War mentality, pursuing unilateralism, 
advocating pre-emptive strategy, listing other countries as targets of nuclear strike 
and lowering the threshold of using nuclear weapons, researching and developing 
new types of nuclear weapons for specific purposes, add new destabilizing factors 
to international security,"95) and recommends to abandon the policies of nuclear 
deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.96) 
  Against hese criticisms, the U.S. responds bystating that "We have reduced the 
role of the nuclear weapons in our deterrence strategy and are cutting our nuclear 
stockpile almost in half, to the lowest level in decades," and precisely explains their 
status as follows:97) 
      The Defense Department's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review codified the 
    diminished role of nuclear weapons in post-Cold War U.S. defense strategy. 
   Importantly, the 2001 NPR also established a New Triad, one that places far 
    less reliante on nuclear capabilities than did its predecessor. The charge that 
    the 2001 NPR called for new nuclear weapons is not correct. The United 
    States is not developing, testing or producing any nuclear warheads and has 
    not dope so in more than a decade. 
      In this regard, there aretwo activities that have been debated extensively: a 
    modest research effort on advanced nuclear-weapon concepts that Congress 
   recently redirected to study technologies to enhance confidencein warhead 
   reliability without esting; and a study on whether - without esting - an 
   existing weapon could be adapted to hold at risk hardened, eeply buried 
    targets. These activities have been mischaracterized by critics. The research 
   on advance concepts had multiple purposes, including the furtherance of
   stockpile stewardship, which is the ongoing U.S. effort to ensure the safety 
   and reliability of its nuclear weapons without esting. In similar fashion, the 
   robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) study is intended to look at one
94) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
95) Statement by Mr. Zhang Yan. (note 20) 
96) NPT/CONF.20051WP.2, 26 April 2005. 
97) The Commitment ofthe United States of'Anierica. (note 40), pp.4-5.
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    possible way to enhance deterrence using an existing warhead. There has 
    been no decision to move beyond the study stage, which will require 
    Presidential and congressional ction. 
       Critics have also arguedthatleaders would see low-yield weapons as 
    readily usable, and that the nuclear threshold would be lowered as a
    consequence of their deployment. This is just not the case. Since the 1950s, 
    the United States has had low-yield weapons. There were thousands at the
    highest of the Cold War. They have not been used. A decision to use nuclear 
    weapons, which must be made by the President, is not easier if yields are 
    lower. The nuclear threshold has always been very high and will remain so.
       On these issues, Russia, the U.K and France made no comment. 
   The issue of the further reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapon 
systems was also discussed at the conférence. The Japanese proposai recommends 
that the Conférence call for nuclear-weapon states to further reduce the operational 
status of nuclear weapon systems in ways that promote international stability and 
security,98) the EU calls on ail states concemed to take appropriate practical 
measures in order to reduce the risk of accidenta) nuclear war,99) and Sweden calls 
on nuclear-weapon states te, de-alert, that is te, reduce the operational status of 
nuclear weapons ystems. 100) 
  The NAC recommends agreeing that the nuclear-weapon states take further 
measures to de-alert and deactivate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear 
warheads from delivery vehicles and to withdraw nuclear forces from active 
deployment pending the total elimination of these weapons.101) On the other hand, 
the nuclear-weapon states that agreed at the 2000 Review Conférence to de-target 
nuclear weapons do not offer further concessions on the issue. 
  The Chairman's working paper deals with these issues in two paragraphe as 
follows: 
  7. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the Conférence calls 
upon the nuclear-weapon states to resolve further to restrict the deployment of 
nuclear weapons, their operational readiness and their potential role as 
defined in national security doctrines. 
  The Japan-Australia proposai calls for a further reduction in the operational 
status of nuclear weapons systems and a diminished role for nuclear weapons in
98) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21, 4 May 2005. 
99) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nicolas Schmit. (note 44) 
100) Statement by H. E. Ms. Laila Freivalds. (note 25) 
101) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005.
76 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 53: 47
security policies, and the NAC also urges to de-alert and deactivate nuclear 
weapons systems and to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security 
policies, in accordance with the agreed commitments at the 2000 review 
conférence. The U.S. demands to delete this paragraph in its entirety. 
  8. The Conférence calls on the nuclear-weapon states to forego any efforts 
to research and develop new types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. 
  The Japan-Australia proposai does not touch upon this issue, but the NAC 
recommends against developing new types of nuclear weapons, and the NAM 
worries that the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons could 
impair the commitment of nuclear disarmament. The U.S. demands to delete this 
paragraph in its entirety.
Verification and Disposition of Fissile Material
  Placing fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes 
under IAEA verification and disposai was agreed to at the 2000 Review Conférence 
and was implemented by the U.S. and Russia. 
  The U.S. stated at the Main Committee I that "the U.S. has removed 174 tons of 
highly enriched uranium and 52 tons of plutonium from further use as fissile 
material in nuclear warheads, placing some of this material under IAEA safeguards, 
and thus far converting approximately 60 tons irreversibly for uses as civil reactor 
fuel. The U.S. and Russia have committed to dispose of 34 tons each of plutonium 
so that it is no longer usable for nuclear weapons. Under the 1993 HEU Purchase 
Agreement, the U.S. and Russia have down-blended over 240 metric tons of HEU 
from Russian nuclear weapons." The U.S. also refers to the cooperative threat 
reduction program since 1992 and G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction of 2002.102) Russia also refers to the 
implementation of the programme for the reprocessing of 500 tons of highly-
enriched uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons into nuclear power plant 
fuel and the complete reprocessing 250 tons of HEU as its contribution to 
irreversible nuclear disarmament.103) 
  Japan is very active on this issue, proposing the following two paragraphs in its 
working paper and Japan-Australia working paper. On international cooperation in
102) Statement by Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders. (note 31) 
103) Statement by H. E. Mr. Sergey 1. Kislyak. (note 17)
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reducing nuclear-weapon-related materials, it reads: "With a view to accelerating 
the reduction of nuclear weapons excess to military needs, the Conférence 
encourages states to pursue efforts within the framework of international 
cooperation initiatives for the reduction of nuclear-weapon-related materials, such 
as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme and the Group of Eight Global 
Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction." Regarding 
securing fissile materials, il reads: "The Conférence stresses that fissile material 
resulting from reduction in nuclear arsenals must be controlled and protected to the 
highest standard, and calls for arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place 
fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international 
verification as soon as is practicable, to ensure that such material is irreversibly 
removed from use for nuclear weapons,"104) 
  The EU recognizes the importance, from the point of view of nuclear 
disarmament, of the programmes for the destruction and elimination of nuclear 
weapons and the elimination of fissile materials as defined under the G8 Global 
Partnership,105) and the NAC stresses the need for all five nuclear-weapon states to 
make arrangements for the placing of their fissile material no longer required for 
military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and to 
make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in 
order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military 
programmes. 106) 
  The Chairman's working paper provides for as follows: 
  11. The Conférence seeks affirmation by the nuclear-weapon states that 
they will place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated as no longer 
required for weapons purposes under IAEA or other relevant international 
verification, and, welcoming work already undertaken on the development of 
verification capabilities for nuclear disarmament, urges that such work be 
initiated by those nuclear-weapon states not already doing so. 
  The U.S. demands to add "controls" after "IAEA", and delete "or other relevant 
international verification."
Reporting on and Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament
In the 2000 final document, increased transparency with regard to nuclear
104) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21, 4 May 2005; NPT/CONF.2005/WP.34, 11 May 2005. 
105) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nicolas Schmit. (note 44) 
106) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005.
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weapon capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant o article VI 
and regular eporting on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 
1995 decision on Principles and Objectives are included. The NAC states that "Full 
acknowledgement for the progress that the nuclear-weapon states assert they are 
making towards nuclear disarmament requires greater transparency. A first step 
towards transparency is the regular submission of Article VI reports in accordance 
with step 12 as agreed at the 2000 Review Conférence," 107) and urges "to agree that 
the nuclear-weapon states take further action towards increasing their transparency 
and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapon arsenals and their 
implementation of disarmament measures and in this context o recall the obligation 
to report as agreed in step 12."Los) 
  The NAM calls for the application of the principles of irreversibility and 
increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states regarding nuclear disarmament 
and other related arms control and reduction measures.109) Many other states 
express concern on the lack of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability of the 
Moscow Treaty. 
  The first draft by the Chairman "acknowledges efforts by the nuclear-weapon 
states to improve transparency, and recognises that increased information on 
existing levels of nuclear weapons and fissile material held by nuclear-weapon 
states, provided on an annual basis, facilitates measuring ongoing efforts to 
implement Article VI." However, the second draft and the final version shifted its 
emphasis to reporting of the implementation of Article VI, providing for as follows: 
  12. Reaffirming the importance of reporting, the Conférence welcomes the 
reports and information submitted to the Conférence and agrees to provide 
reports on implementation of Article VI on an annual basis. 
  The U.S. demands to replace "agrees" with "encourages all states party," as well 
as to delete "on an annual basis."
Négative Security Assurances
  Negative security assurances have been on issue of high priority for non-
nuclear-weapon states, and in particular for the non-aligned states, since the time of 
the negotiation of the treaty as an issue of principle. In addition, the non-aligned 
states worry about the increasing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, because
107) Statement by Ambassador Tim Caughley on Behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, 18 May 2005. 
108) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005. 
109) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005.
2006] THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 79
of the adoption by the Bush administration of the new doctrine of pre-emption. 
Although the 2000 Review Conférence called upon the Preparatory Committee to 
make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conférence on the issue of legally 
binding security assurances, this has not been realized. 
  The NAM, reiterating that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and 
legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons should 
be pursued as a matter of priority, calls for the negotiation of a universal, 
unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances, as it is the 
legitimate right of states that have given up the nuclear-weapon option to receive 
security assurances. It also believes that legally binding security assurances within 
the context of the treaty would provide an essential benefit o the states parties. 110) 
  The NAC calls upon the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their existing 
commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of 
multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-
weapon states parties, which could either be in the format of a separate agreement 
reached in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifération of Nuclear Weapons 
or as a protocol to the Treaty.111) South Africa urges the negotiation of legally 
binding security assurances by the nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-
weapon states parties, believing that non-nuclear-weapon states have the right to be 
provided with internationally legally binding security assurances under the NPT 
that would protect hem against he use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.112) The 
Republic of Korea also supports the concept of negative security assurances as a 
practical means of reducing the sense of insecurity, and believes that nuclear-
weapon states should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-
nuclear-weapon states that faithfully meet their NPT and other safeguard 
obligations. 113) 
  Russia supports the earliest possible beginning, at the CD, negotiations on an 
FMCT, and the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear 
disarmament issues and negative security assurances. 114) China believes that il is 
more than justified for the non-nuclear-weapon states to request o be free from the
110) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, 2 May 2005. 
111) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, 4 May 2005. 
112) Statement by Mr. Abdul Samad Minty. (note 92) 
113) Statement by H. E. Park In-kook, Ambassador, Alternative Head of the Republic of Korea at the 
    2005 Review Conférence of the Parties to the NPT, Main Committee I, 19 May 2005, New 
   York. 
114) Statement by H. E. Mr. Sergey L Kislyak. (note 17)
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threat of nuclear weapons upon foregoing development of those weapons, and to 
have nuclear-weapon states provide assurances in this regard in a legally binding 
form. China undertakes, unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China 
has consistently urged ail nuclear-weapon states to undertake these commitments in
a legal form, and will continue to do soi l5) China urges that internationally legally 
binding instruments on these issues should be concluded as early as possible and 
that the CD should re-establish an ad hoc committee on negative security 
assurances and start substantive work and negotiations without delay.116) 
  The U.S., the U.K. and France are opposed to the idea of legally binding 
negative security assurances, stating that security assurances included in the UN 
Security Council resolution 984 of 1995 are enough and that there is no change in 
their policy. The EU urges pursuing consideration of the issue of security 
assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT and calls on 
nuclear-weapon states to reaffirm existing security assurances noted by the UN 
Security Council in resolution 984 (1995).' 17) 
  Security assurances were discussed under the mandate of the subsidiary body 1 
on "nuclear disarmament and security assurances," but substantive and constructive 
discussion that would lead to a compromised agreement have not conducted 
because time was extremely limited and big différences of position existed between 
the U.S., the U.K. and France on the one hand and the NAM and the NAC on the 
other hand. 
  A working paper submitted by the Chairman on this issue has seven paragraphs, 
but the foliowing two are substantive: 
  3. The Conférencecalls upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect fully 
their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the 
conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for 
ail non-nuclear weapon states party. 
  7. The Conférence agrees on the need for further work, in the context of 
the strengthened review process, to be undertaken during the next review 
period on how security assurances would be encapsulated in legally binding 
instrument with a view to endorsing the outcome of these deliberations at the 
2010 NPT Review Conférence. 
  Paragraph 3 only deals with the first half of the NAC proposai. In addition, the
115) Statement by Mr. Zhang Yan. (note 20) 
116) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.7, 26 April 2005. 
117) Statement by H. E. Mr. Nicolas Schmit. (note 44)
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NAC urges for legally binding security assurances in the form of a new treaty in the 
context of the NPT or a protocol to the treaty. The NAM firmly demands the 
negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding document on negative 
security assurances. To these paragraphs, the U.S., the U.K. and France are 
opposed. 
  Further, the Chairman's working paper includes the following paragraph: 
  6. The Conférence recognises that assurances against the use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons are conditional and not applicable if any beneficiary is 
in material breach of its own non-prolifération and disarmament obligations 
under the treaty. 
  Malaysia, Cuba and others oppose this paragraph.
Assessment of the Conférence and Future Prospects
Assessment of the Conférence
  The 2005 NPT Review Conférence is generally assessed as a failure, as the 
Secretary-General of the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan states that "Regrettably, there are 
times when multilateral forums tend merely to reflect, rather than mend, deep rifts 
over how to confront the threats we face. The Review Conférence of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, which ended on Friday with no substantive agreement, 
was one of these. Today, the treaty faces a dual crisis of compliance and 
confidence. Delegations at the month-long conférence, which is held once every 
five years, could not furnish the world with any solutions to the grave nuclear 
threats we all face." 118) 
  The failure to adopt a substantive document at the conference reflects the 
situation of the international environment at the time of the conférence, and 
depends in great part on the attitude of the states parties that play a central role, as 
is shown in the analysis of the six previous review conférences. 
  The Review Conférence itself could not agree on a final document in 1975, but 
the strong leadership of the chairman produced a final declaration. In both 1980 
and 1990 the Review Conférences adopted no documents. In 1985, there was no 
consensus on the issue of the CTBT, but participants adopted a final declaration by 
including both pros and cons on the CTBT. In 1995, states parties agreed on three
118) Kofi A. Annan, "Break the Nuclear Deadlock", International Herald Tribune, Monday, 30 May 
   2005. [http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/29/news/edannan.php]
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decisions including one on an indefinite extension of the treaty and one resolution, 
but they could not agree on the review of the operations of the treaty. 
  The 2000 Review Conférence did adopt a final document which included both 
the review of the past five years and the measures recommended for the future. It 
was really a rare case. Before the conférence, many states were pessimistic on the 
final outcome of the conférence, because the international climate was not good. 
For example, there was the sharp confrontation between the U.S. and China on the 
future of the ABM Treaty, and the U.S. Senate rejected the ratification of the CTBT 
in 1999. 
  The key players at the 2000 Review Conférence were the five nuclear-weapon 
states and the New Agenda Coalition. The nuclear-weapon states submitted a 
common statement at the end of the first week, showing their common position for 
negotiation by shelving the thorny issue of the ABM Treaty. On the other hand, the 
NAC submitted a draft document with excellent content, due to a group consisting 
of experienced ambassadors versed in nuclear disarmament issues, and 
representatives of non-nuclear-weapon states. Both displayed their leadership fully 
to lead the negotiation towards an agreed ocument. 
  In addition, it should be remembered that one of the reasons for the successful 
outcome at the 2000 Review Conférences was the states parties showing very 
friendly attitudes by yielding their original positions to negotiate a compromise. 
For example, the original version of the NAC proposal on the unequivocal 
undertaking of nuclear elimination included much more detailed measures that 
should have materialized in the subsequent five years. The NAC agreed to drop 
these measures and Russia and France were very reluctant to accept the 
unequivocal undertakings, but finally softened their positions and agreed to it. For 
its part, the NAC agreed to drop its demands which the nuclear-weapon states had 
opposed. Although there was a sharp confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq on 
the final day, they finally found phrases that were satisfactory to both by extending 
the negotiation to the next day. 
  The 2005 Review Conférence, to the contrary, witnessed no willingness to 
compromise by any main player. This is one of the reasons for the failure of the 
conférence. The main players at the conférence were the U.S., Egypt and Iran. The 
five nuclear-weapon states could not agree on a common statement, as is shown by 
the fierce criticism of the U.S. attitude by China, although they were reportedly 
consulting. There was a sharp différence among them, for example, on the CTBT 
that Russia, the U.K. and France have already ratified and that the U.S. is strongly 
opposed to.
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  The NAC could not display as strong leadership as it did in 2000. Egypt, a 
member of the NAC, played an extraordinarily radical role without support from 
other members of the NAC or the NAM. Although New Zealand and Malaysia 
made statements on behalf of the NAC and the NAM respectively, they did not play 
important roles nor did they display any leadership as the representatives of the 
groups. 
  If the nuclear-weapon states and the NAC or the NAM started negotiations, 
middle powers such as Japan, Australia, Canada or the EU could have played an 
important intermediary role. However, such a situation did not emerge this time. 
As a new development of the 2005 Review Conférence, the EU has submitted joint 
working papers that are supported by more than 25 states. It was expected that the 
EU could play a leading role because of its many useful and acceptable 
recommendations supported by many states. However, the Minister delegate of 
Luxembourg has shown no leadership. In addition, the President of the Conférence, 
Mr. Sergio Duarte, did not or could not display enough leadership to lead the 
Conférence towards a final success. 
  At the background of the conférence, a new threat to the nuclear non-
prolifération regime has emerged in the statement of withdrawal by North Korea, 
nuclear suspicions of Iran, revelations of a nuclear black market controlled by Mr. 
A. Q. Kahn, the possibility of nuclear terrorism and other such concerns. No state 
objects to the conférence dealing with these issues. Indeed, the new threats were 
expected to be nome of the focal points of the discussions at the conférence. 
  On the other hand, the issue of nuclear disarmament wasexpected to be the 
other focal point of the conférence, because the U.S. emphasized the usefulness of 
small nuclear weapons in its security policy and proceeded with a study of the new 
concept of nuclear weapons and the shortening of the preparation time for the 
resumption of nuclear testing. Additionally no progress has been made in the 
denuclearization of the Middle East. Finally, the U.S. strongly argued that the 
outcomes of the previous review conférences were neither effective nor applicable 
anymore. 
  The U.S. demanded to discuss only nuclear non-prolifération issues, in 
particular the issue of non-compliance, as it thought hat there was no problem in 
nuclear disarmament that is implemented by the U.S. The non-aligned states, 
including Egypt, argued that without discussing nuclear disarmament they could not 
discuss the issue of non-prolifération. Both insisted on their positions strenuously, 
without showing any possibility for compromise. This stubbornness i one of the 
most fundamental causes of the failure of the conférence.
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  The Egyptian objection to the provisional agenda submitted by the President on 
the last day of the first week and to other procedural matters that later prevented 
substantive discussion for almost two weeks should be blamed, because we did not 
have enough time to discuss substantive matters although it is doubtful whether we 
could have agreed on a consensus document even if we had enough time. In this 
sense, Egypt should be blamed for its position blocking the proceedings of the 
conférence. However, we should not overlook the background of this position but 
should find its real cause. 
  It was understandable that the U.S. referred to the threat of the crisis in nuclear 
non-prolifération and insisted that measures be taken to meet he crisis, focusing on 
the issues of North Korea and Iran, in order for the international community as a 
whole to positively deal with these issues by sending a clear message to them. All 
states hould have cooperated with the U.S. and agreed to strengthen the nuclear 
non-prolifération regime that was eroding. 
  However, the U.S., on the other hand, repeated only that the U.S. has been 
committed to Article VI. The U.S. declined to discuss the implementation of the 
agreements adopted at the previous review conférences, in particular, the thirteen 
concrete steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to in 2000. The U.S. defended its 
position by stating that the U.S. was not bound by those agreements because they 
were agreed to in certain political circumstance and that the circumstance have 
changed ramatically, making the agreement non-binding today. 
  Against this argument, almost all other states, including other nuclear-weapon 
states, declared the agreements alive and binding, though they were politically 
binding, and argued that we should advance taking into account hese agreements. 
Many states treat the decision on "Principles and Objectives" as a condition for the 
indefinite xtension of the treaty of 1995, seeing them as a package without a vote. 
The decision on the extension is legally binding and the decision on "Principles and 
Objectives" is politically binding, expressing an agreed upon interpretation of 
Article VI. 
  The U.S. claimed that there was nothing in the treaty which prevented the 
nuclear-weapon states from modernizing their nuclear forces. The U.S. strenuously 
opposed the CTBT in particular, and demanded to delete all parts that related to the 
final document of the 2000 Review Conférence in the Chairman's draft working 
paper on nuclear disarmament submitted to the subsidiary body 1 of the 2005 
Review Conférence. Many non-nuclear-weapon states were afraid that the 
agreements adopted in the package including indefinite extension and elaborated 
into the 13 steps would lose their validity if the U.S. remained strongly opposed. If
2006] THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 85
a new agreement is adopted in accordance with the U.S. preferences, the new 
agreement would supercede the previous agreements and then the agreements from 
1995 and 2000 would have no validity. That may be one of the reasons why non-
aligned states, including Egypt, did not want to discuss substantive issues by 
objecting to procedural matters. 
  The significance that the U.S. attached to this conférence can be assessed 
through various aspects. While Vice-President Gore and Secretary of State 
Albright made statements at the general debate at the Review Conférence in 1995 
and 2000 respectively, Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State made a 
statement for the U.S. in 2005. In addition, no high officiais who have the authority 
to change U.S. policy attended the conférence. As a result, the U.S. kept its 
original position without any compromise, showing a very stubborn attitude. This 
makes clear that the U.S. had no plan to negotiate a compromise from the 
beginning. 
  As a general assessment, you may be able to say that the conférence was useful 
because a certain level of discussion was conducted and the position of each state or 
state group became clear. However, the assessment of the conférence as a whole 
must be more negative because of the very limited time for discussion and the Jack 
of substantive and constructive discussion aimed at a compromise leading to a 
consensus document. Even if we had enough time, it would have been difficult to 
reach agreement because there were fundamental différence of opinion between 
some nuclear-weapon states and some non-aligned states. If we had three weeks 
for substantive discussion as originally planned, instead of one week, discussion 
could have been more detailed, resulting in partial consensus or resulting in useful 
discussion for future development. 
  As a conclusion, the confrontational structure that prevented any compromise 
existed not only during the conférence but also before the conférence, and stubborn 
attitudes were prevailing in the international environment. They are the root of the 
failure of the conférence.
Future Perspective
  The fact that the conférence failed to agree on a consensus substantive document 
does not necessarily mean that the NPT or the international nuclear non-
prolifération regime is at risk of breakdown. The fundamental structure of the non-
prolifération regime will be kept alive, as many states parties stated that the NPT 
was a cornerstone of the international security system, and they would make efforts
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to strengthen the NPT regime. 
  However, the failure of the conférence has had considerable negative influence 
on the NPT and the regime, and the integrity of the NPT and the regime has eroded. 
  First,, the conférence sent a negative message regarding the future prospect for 
progress in nuclear disarmament. This is due to the U.S. ignoring the agreements 
of 1995 and 2000 and trying to undermine their effectiveness. The U.S. demanded 
to delete five paragraphs in their entirety among the 12 paragraphs submitted by the 
Chairman of the subsidiary body 1, the content of which is almost the saure as the 
content of the final document adopted in 2000 by consensus. 
  In particular, the progress in the early entryinto force of the CTBT would be 
impossible unless the U.S. changes its attitude towards it. Many states have already 
ratified the CTBT, but 11 among 44 states whose ratification is needed for its entry 
into force have not. Columbia, Indonesia and Vietnam have a high possibility of 
ratification if states concerned positively persuade them. In order to get the 
ratification of Israel, Egypt and Iran in the Middle East, India and Pakistan in South 
Asia, and North Korea in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to proceed with an 
improvement in the security environment of these regions in parallel. China, which 
daims that it is eager to get ratification by its congress, seems waiting for U.S. 
ratification. The key to the entry into force of the CTBT is the attitude of the U.S. 
If the U.S. ratifies, China will follow suit. U.S. ratification will additionally 
persuade other relevant states as well. 
  Currently, all states observethe test moratorium. However, as the U.S. works to 
shorten the preparation time to resume testing and to study new types of nuclear 
weapons, the possibility of the resumption of testing can not be excluded 
completely. If the U.S. conducts testing, other states will follow and the 
international nuclear non-prolifération regime will suffer a decisive wound. 
  Although there seems to be general consensus on the immediate commencement 
of the negotiation of an FMCT in the CD, the early commencement of the 
negotiation will not take place as is shown in the ambiguous wording without direct 
reference to an FMCT in the Chairman's working paper at the subsidiary body 1. 
In addition, it is necessary but very hard to agree on the program of work of the 
CD, because the issue of linkage with other items must be discussed and solved. 
One more difficult issue is how to deal with verification of an FMCT, as the U.S. 
opposes a verification mechanism while many non-nuclear-weapon states think it 
indispensable. 
  The U.S. and Russia treat he Moscow Treaty as a symbol of implementing their 
obligations under Article VI and will not take further measures oon. However, it
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is critical that the two states take further measures in order to prevent the treaty 
losing effect in 2012. Steps be taken as soon as possible. In addition, as the 
START I Treaty is to lose effect in 2009 on which the verification of the Moscow 
Treaty depends, consultations between the two will be necessary. 
  Both the U.S. and Russia are currently very reluctant o deal with non-strategic 
nuclear weapons, stating their control must be considered in the context of all other 
weapon systems. However, it may be possible to consult or negotiate measures to 
improve control and security of these nuclear weapons. The negotiations, including 
both the reduction of Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of 
U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in NATO western European states 
may be possible, although it seems unlikely soon. 
  The nuclear-weapon states in general assert hat they are diminishing the role of 
nuclear weapons in their security policy. In particular, the U.S. claims that it 
significantly diminished the role of nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Posture Review 
of 2002. It is true that the role of nuclear weapons bas decreased in a strategic 
aspect between the U.S. and Russia. However, in a non-strategic aspect heir role is 
increasing as the U.S. tries to develop small nuclear weapons or "bunker busters." 
In addition, the cases where nuclear weapons may be used are increasing in the 
nuclear doctrine of both the U.S. and Russia and neither supports the no-first use 
doctrine. The development and deployment of a U.S. missile defense system may 
force China and Russia to modemize their nuclear arsenals. 
  Second, on nuclear non-prolifération, there are urgent issues like North Korea 
and Iran. The issue of North Korea will be continuously dealt with in the 
framework of the Six Party Talks, and the Iran nuclear issue will be negotiated 
among Iran and the three EU countries, (the U.K., France and Germany). It will 
probably be difficult to reach an early settlement in either case. It is very 
regrettable that the 2005 Review Conference failed to send a clear message to these 
states and agree on further measures on non-prolifération. 
  Most states urge that the additional protocol should be a standard or a condition 
for nuclear export. It may be. possible to develop these measures within the IAEA 
or the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSC). New measures initiated by the U.S. such as 
the Prolifération Security Initiative (PSI) and measures taken under the UN 
Security Council resolution 1540 are complementary to the NPT, and should be 
pursued in accordance with current rules of international law. They are useful as a 
symptomatic treatment, but we also need in parallel the resolution of root causes. 
  Regarding problems in the Middle East, the highest priority among states parties 
in the Middle East focuses on Israeli nuclear weapons. The growing frustration
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among the Middle East states parties at the conference with the lack of progress in 
the implementation of the Middle East resolution adopted at the 1995 review 
conférence is very clear. There has been no progress in establishing a nuclear-
weapon-free zone or a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, 
while Israel is modernizing its nuclear forces with help from the U.S. The Middle 
East states place more emphasis on the Israel problem including its accession to the 
NPT than the issue of withdrawal. 
  It is urgent that the U.S. treat this issue seriously, promoting the peace process 
in the Middle East. Otherwise, the possibility of a breakdown in the regime cannot 
be completely excluded. As one of the causes of the failure of the conférence, the 
importance of this aspect should be recognized. 
  Third, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, some states urge restriction on 
sensitive activities such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. They 
propose restrictions on the export or the multilateral control of these activities. On 
the other hand, many developing countries demand their inalienable right to 
develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is 
necessary to accommodate these différent positions between the non-prolifération 
of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Conclusion
  The 2005 NPT Review Conférence that was held for four weeks in May did not 
agree on any substantive document, as more than half of the time was wasted on 
procedural matters resulting in limited time for the substantive discussions. At the 
background of this failure, there was a divisive confrontation on the priority 
between uclear non-prolifération and nuclear disarmament. There was also a big 
différence of opinion on what the threat is and how to deal with it. 
  In the international community after the year 2000, there emerged new threats 
such as North Korea's statement on the withdrawal from the NPT, the suspicion of 
Iran's nuclear program, the revelation of a nuclear black market by A.Q. Kahn, the 
possibility of nuclear terrorism and others. The U.S. insisted upon focusing the 
debate on these non-prolifération issues. Many other states urged discussion both 
on non-prolifération and disarmament issues in a balanced manner. 
  The U.S. claimed that the agreements at the previous review conférences, in 
particular the thirteen concrete steps for nuclear disarmament agreed in consensus 
in 2000, were not effective anymore and avoided reference to these agreements, 
while insisting that it has been completely committed to the obligations on nuclear
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disarmament under Article VI. Conversely, many non-nuclear-weapon states 
believed that the U.S. attitude was too unilateral and unacceptable, and the review 
should be based on previous agreements, including agreements from the previous 
review conférences. 
  The intransigent attitudes shown by both sides at the conférence where 
fundamentally différent positions were held lead to the breakdown of the 
conférence. Although the failure of the conférence had been anticipated even 
before it started, the result was much worse and unsatisfactory because of the Jack 
of time for substantive discussions. 
  It is inevitable that the international nuclear non-prolifération regime will be 
negatively impacted by the failure of the conférence. It is urgent that every state 
make efforts to maintain and strengthen the regime by taking measures step by step 
that were discussed at the conférence in both nuclear non-prolifération and nuclear 
disarmament.
[No. 53: 47OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA W REVIE90
